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Abstract—Heap layout randomization renders a good portion
of heap vulnerabilities unexploitable. However, some remnants of
the vulnerabilities are still exploitable even under the randomized
layout. According to our analysis, such heap exploits often abuse
pointer-width allocation granularity to spray crafted pointers. To
address this problem, we explore the efficacy of byte-granularity
(the most fine-grained) heap randomization. Heap randomization,
in general, has been a well-trodden area; however, the efficacy
of byte-granularity randomization has never been fully explored
as misalignment raises various concerns. This paper unravels
the pros and cons of byte-granularity heap randomization by
conducting comprehensive analysis in three folds: (i) security
effectiveness, (ii) performance impact, and (iii) compatibility
analysis to measure deployment cost. Security discussion based
on 20 CVE case studies suggests that byte-granularity heap
randomization raises the bar against heap exploits more than
we initially expected; as pointer spraying approach is becoming
prevalent in modern heap exploits. Afterward, to demystify the
skeptical concerns regarding misalignment, we conduct cycle-level
microbenchmarks and report that the performance cost is highly
concentrated to edge cases depending on L1-cache line. Based
on such observations, we design and implement an allocator
suited to optimize the performance cost of byte-granularity
heap randomization; then evaluate the performance with the
memory-intensive benchmark (SPEC2006). Finally, we discuss
compatibility issues using Coreutils, Nginx, and ChakraCore.
I. INTRODUCTION
Memory corruption vulnerabilities are widely exploited as
attack vectors. According to the recent statistics from the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database, the
majority of the arbitrary code execution exploits that have
a CVSS score greater than 9.0 are caused by heap-based
vulnerabilities such as use-after-free and heap overflow [30].
Recent vulnerability reports [33] also suggest that most of
the usefully exploitable bugs are typically caused by heap
corruptions. So far, numerous heap randomization approaches
have been proposed. However, some remnants of vulnera-
bilities still survive due to their exploitation primitives. In
modern heap exploit attacks, type confusions between integer-
pointer or float-pointer are often utilized [25], [24]. To trigger
such confusion, a crafted object/pointer spraying technique is
required. These advanced heap exploitation techniques take
advantage of the fact that although the overall heap layout is
unpredictable, the pointer-width alignment of any heap chunk
is deterministic (the chunk address is always divisible by
sizeof(void*)).
Several heap-related defense approaches, including [48],
[35], [52], [34], [36], [49], [45], have provided insights into
making the heap exploitation more difficult by effectively
randomizing the heap layout. However, none of the previous
methods considered reducing this randomization granularity
into byte-level as it breaks the “CPU word alignment” for heap
memory access. For example, [49], [56] and [36] randomizes
the heap layout by prepending a random sized dummy memory
space between each heap chunk; however, the randomized
distance between heap chunk is guaranteed to be divisible
by sizeof(void*) to respect the CPU word granularity
memory alignment. In the case of [39], the paper suggests the
importance of reducing the memory allocation granularity1 for
heap defense. However, the paper considers the pointer-width
granularity (8-bytes) as the smallest possible allocation in their
discussion.
Regardless of the heap randomization entropy, unless the
allocation granularity is bigger than the width of a pointer,
the possibility of such an overlapping event increases as the
attacker expands the out-of-bounds accessed2 heap region
inside the target heap segment. In many cases, the adversary
has no restriction as to the size of sprayed data. Byte granular-
ity randomization imposes constant probability of failure for
dereferencing of any attacker-crafted pointer inside the out-of-
bounds heap area.
Heap exploitation often accompany a spraying a large
chunk of memory with a payload that has crafted pointers in it.
These malicious pointers crafted by the attacker will overwrite
good pointers inside heap (out-of-bounds write vulnerability)
or dereferenced by benign codes posing as intact pointers
(out-of-bounds read vulnerability). Due to the spatial locality,
the attacker is likely to control the relative layout of her
spray and target region. Once the two region overlaps, pointer
manipulation reliably works as they share the same word
alignment.
To mitigate such attack techniques, we explore the effi-
cacy of byte-granularity heap randomization (eliminating the
predictability of any memory alignment) and show its detailed
results and numerous findings. The need for byte-granularity
heap randomization is also inspired by statements of the
security researchers at Google Project-Zero, or Pwn2Own
contest winners who often emphasized the accurate prediction
of word alignment and chunk allocation granularity for making
the exploitation possible and reliable3.
1To quote the paper: “memory managers at all levels should use finer
memory allocation granularity for better security”
2In this paper, out-of-bounds access implies inter-chunk memory access that
crosses the heap chunk boundary, including the use of dangling pointers.
3“How the original type object members align with the confused type object
members has a big impact on the exploitability and the reliability” [28]
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The effectiveness of byte granularity heap randomization
is based on the observation that the majority of heap exploit
attacks inevitably involves pointer corruption with attacker-
crafted values such as string, integer or float; and confusing the
application to dereference such attacker-crafted values as intact
pointers. Since the width of a pointer is universally known, and
the heap chunk at a random location address always follows
multiples of this allocation granularity, the attacker can spray
her crafted-value repeatedly into the out-of-bounds heap region
without calculating its exact location, and defragment the heap
until the attacker’s crafted-pointer exactly overlaps the benign
target pointer. This effect will be illustrated with a figure
in section II.
According to our analysis and experiments, the efficacy
of byte-granularity heap randomization for exploit mitigation
can be stronger than simply hindering a single dereferenc-
ing of crafted pointer. The reason is that because advanced
heap exploits often require a set of crafted pointer chains.
To show the security effectiveness of byte-granularity heap
randomization, we use public heap corruption vulnerabilities
which enabled successful attack demonstration in Pwn2Own
contest, bug bounty programs, or real-world malware. We use
the corresponding CVEs as case studies and explore how byte-
granularity heap randomization would affect the exploitability
of such vulnerabilities.
Aside from security issues, byte-granularity heap random-
ization can be considered skeptical regarding its practical-
ity due to hardware-level limitation as it involves unaligned
memory access. However, major CPU vendors such as In-
tel and ARM started putting efforts to support arbitrarily
misaligned (byte-granularity) memory access from hardware
level [41], [38]. Based on instruction-level microbenchmark
results, we designed an allocator which adopts byte-granularity
randomness to each heap chunk address while minimizing
the performance penalty induced by unaligned access. We
name our allocator “Randomly Unaligned Memory Allo-
cator (RUMA)”. Performance regarding chunk management
and allocation speed of RUMA does not outperform tradi-
tional heap allocators. However, RUMA leverages architec-
ture specifics and reduces memory access penalty of byte-
granularity heap randomization. The design of RUMA is based
on per-instruction micro-benchmarks of Intel ISA.
To measure the performance impact of RUMA, we apply
various allocators (RUMA, tcmalloc, dlmalloc, jemalloc and
ottomalloc) to SPEC2006 and compare their benchmark re-
sults. To test compatibility and analyze various correctness
issues of byte-granularity heap randomization (which results
misaligned memory access), we use Coreutils utilities test
suite, Nginx web server test suite, and ChakraCore JavaScript
engine test suite. We discuss the various issues regarding com-
patibility in section V and summarize limitations in section VI.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF BYTE-GRANULARITY HEAP
RANDOMIZATION
In modern heap exploitation, achieving direct manipulation
of code pointer is unlikely due to the state-of-the-art compiler
defenses such as VTGuard, pointer encryption, and VT-read-
only checks citesarbinowski2016vtpin. As a result, the surviv-
ing remnants of heap exploitation techniques often target data
pointer and involve convoluted steps of pointer manipulation
to complete the exploit. The key procedure is controlling
the program to use the attacker-crafted non-pointer values as
an intact pointer. Exploitation of typical heap vulnerabilities
such as use-after-free, out-of-bounds access (including heap
overflow), type confusion and uninitialized access mostly
involves multiple steps of invalid pointer dereference to trigger
information leakage, achieve arbitrary memory access and
finally, execute arbitrary code.
Traditional heap spray places a huge amount of NOP-
sled and shellcodes into predictable heap address4 as direct
code pointer manipulation was easy, however, the goal of
modern heap spray is more focused on placing crafted pointers
around out-of-bounds heap area. Because heap spray allows
an attacker to control a broad range of heap region, mali-
cious pointer-spraying could be a threat without any (for 32-
bit address space) or with only limited (for 64-bit address
space) information disclosure. In this section, we first clarify
the attack model and assumptions, then discuss the security
effectiveness of byte-granularity heap randomization in three
terms: (i) successful triggering of heap vulnerability (ii) infor-
mation leakage attacks (iii) bypassing byte-granularity heap
randomization.
A. Attack Model and Assumption
The goal of byte-granularity heap randomization is to
hinder the pointer-spraying which is often a critical method-
ology for building multiple-staged exploits. Pointer spraying
is an attack technique that constructs out-of-bounds access
data (could be read by benign code or written against benign
data) with a repeated sequence of pointers. Because the at-
tacker can guarantee that any pointer (and 64bit variables)
inside heap must follow specific address alignment (e.g.,
sizeof(void*)), spraying the same byte sequence of any
64bit variable allows correct dereferencing of out-of-bounds
access if the spray region overlaps with the out-of-bounds
access area. This allows an attacker to manipulate pointers
without pinpointing its location or predicting the exact distance
between dangling-pointer fake objects.
Our discussion is based on the assumption that the attacker
initially builds the exploit chain based on limited address
layout prediction. We assume memory disclosure capability
that the attacker initially has provides limited information
regarding address layout. For example, an information leakage
bug can expose some pointer values that allows attacker to
calculate corresponding segment base addresses (e.g., a code
pointer reveals the base address of one code segment); and
sophisticated heap allocation control based on object allocator
analysis allows attacker to predict the relative heap memory
layout (chunk sequence, distribution, and so forth). The attack
model does not assume that the attacker initially has the ca-
pability of thoroughly arbitrary/repeatable memory disclosure;
which reveals the entire address space equally as debugging the
application. Byte-granularity heap randomization augments the
existing defense with finer-granularity, and hence we assume
the presence of adequately configured and applied ASLR
4Heap address prediction via massive heap spray is feasible under 32-bit
address space layout randomization. In case of 64-bit address space layout
randomization, heap spray becomes equally feasible if a heap segment base
address is exposed.
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Fig. 1: Simplified example cases of dereferencing a dangling pointer for Use-After-Free under pointer-spray attack (assuming
0xdeadbeefcafebabe is the crafted pointer). The box in the middle represents dangling pointed object and each row indicates
pointer-type member variable. Assume there are five possible dangling pointers due to randomization. For better visualization,
the memory dump is shown in big-endian format.
and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) as the previous study
does. Finally, we expect that our attacker feeds untrusted
input (e.g., PDF document, JavaScript, Network Stream) to the
corresponding application parser that has heap vulnerabilities.
B. Successful Triggering of Heap Vulnerabilities
Any triggering step of heap vulnerabilities that occurs due
to out-of-bounds access5 are affected by byte-granularity heap
randomization. For example, the first use of dangling-pointer in
use-after-free guarantees to crash any application with 87.5%
(75% in 32-bit) probability as there are eight (four in 32-bit)
possible outcomes of the misinterpreted pointer alignment.
Consider the exploitation steps of use-after-free: (i) an
object is freed and a dangling pointer is created, (ii) the
attacker places a crafted object around the dangling-pointed
memory region, and (iii) the program uses the dangling pointer
as if the original object member variables (pointer member
variables) are still intact thus using attacker’s crafted pointer.
These steps imply that there are two independent heap chunk
allocations around the dangling-pointed heap area. Although
the address of each heap chunks is random, if the allocation
granularity is bigger than the pointer-width, an attacker can
spray the heap and overlap the fake object and dangling-pointer
thus successfully trigger the use-after-free without pinpointing
the exact memory addresses.
This effectiveness can be described by depicting a sim-
plified example. Figure 1 depicts an example case of deref-
erencing a dangling pointer (to access a pointer member
5In this paper, out-of-bounds access indicates memory access that crosses
heap chunk bound.
variable) after attacker launches a pointer-spray attack. For
simplicity, let’s assume attacker wants to hijack a pointer
into 0xdeadbeefcafebabe and there are five unpredictable
cases of dangling pointers which will be randomly decided at
runtime.
In Figure 1a, an attacker can hijack the target pointer
member variable with a very high chance because the heap ran-
domization follows word-granularity. The attacker can spray
the eight-byte sequence “DE AD BE EF CA FE BA BE”
sufficiently long to defragment the heap region and bypass
the randomization. However in Figure 1b, the randomization
is byte-granularity thus the attack fails with 87.5% probability
regardless of the spray; unless the pointer is composed with
same bytes (we discuss this issue at the end of this section).
The effectiveness of byte-granularity heap randomization is
not specific to particular heap vulnerabilities. We emphasize
that any exploitation step which involves the use of crafted
pointer upon out-of-bounds heap access is affected. For exam-
ple, exploitation of heap overflow, uninitialized heap access
vulnerability also involves out-of-bounds heap access [8], [11]
thus affected by byte-granularity heap randomization.
So far, the security effectiveness of byte-granularity heap
randomization seems small, as one out of eight (or four)
triggering attempts will succeed. However, this probability of
single dereferencing is not the probability of a successful
attack. Modern heap exploitation usually involves multiple
combination and repetition of such bug triggering. According
to Google Project-Zero, successful exploitation of CVE-2015-
3077 required up to 31 times of pointer confusion. As heap
exploitation involves multiple uses of crafted pointers, the
defense probability will increase exponentially. However exact
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calculation of defense probability based on a number of the
crafted pointer is unrealistic as modern heap exploitation
usually achieves complete information leakage capability in
the middle of the exploitation. In next subsection, we discuss
the effectiveness of byte granularity heap randomization con-
sidering information leakages.
C. Information Leakage
Information leakage vulnerabilities are typically discov-
ered in software that implements ECMAScript [27] parsers
including ChakraCore, V8, and Spider Monkey. It is well
established that complete disclosure of memory renders all
the randomness-based exploit defenses ineffective; thus we
confined the attack model to which the attacker is initially
incapable of such capability. However, information leakage
attack can be divided into many types, and each of them
involves various triggering of heap bugs. In this subsection,
we discuss the impact of byte-granularity heap randomization
considering limited information leakage attacks.
Fully repeatable/arbitrary information leakage primitive is
achieved by the special case of literal-array based OOB (Out-
Of-Bounds read/write) vulnerability. For example, if OOB has
write capability which can directly manipulate a backstore
pointer6 successfully; and if the attacker can repeat manip-
ulating/using the manipulated backstore pointer, the attacker
gets. Once the backstore pointer is fully controlled by the
attacker, most defenses regarding memory corruption lose their
meaning.
However, taking control over the backstore pointer is not
a straightforward task. Except for the lucky cases for the
attacker, heap exploitation usually requires multiple steps of
efforts to manipulate the backstore pointer. First of all, only a
few objects have backstore pointer; therefore attacker should
find such objects and control their allocation site and relative
heap layout. Secondly, objects are isolated inside multiple heap
segments depending on their types and sizes due to several
heap isolation. Therefore, if an object with backstore pointer
is not directly reachable via OOB, the attacker should target
the parent pointer of such object. Figure 2 depicts this with
the simplified two-stage example.
Arbitrary controlled OOB, which we discussed so far, is,
in fact, very ruthless exploitation primitive. In reality, not
all OOBs can directly access the memory. For example, in
case the OOB is based on object array, an attacker cannot
directly read/write the out-of-bounds memory contents. Since
ECMAScript parsers do not provide any syntax that can
directly dump the memory contents of an object (never should),
additional work is required to turn such OOB into more useful
exploitation primitive. What attacker can do here is to spray
crafted objects around out-of-bounds object array, making the
application to use a different type of object. Using such object
triggers further type confusions and enables an attacker to
ultimately hijack a backstore pointer. This approach requires
sophisticated object spraying and pointer-width heap allocation
alignment. Figure 3 effectively illustrates such an approach
with the real-world example (CVE-2016-0191) where the
6Backstore pointer is a leaf pointer for reading/writing memory. Taking
control over the backstore pointer usually allows the attacker arbitrary memory
read/write capability.
crafted object spraying technique achieves the information
leakage. The exploitation steps of Figure 3 were used in
Pwn2Own 2016 for achieving information leakage against 64-
bit Edge browser. In this exploitation, attacker achieves infor-
mation leakage primitive by making the ChakraCore confuse
the reference of the pointer inside JavaScriptDate object
as the pointer of a DataView object. The exploitation repeats
spraying the crafted DataView object and using the dangling
pointer of JavaScriptDate object until two object region
overlaps with same pointer-width alignment.
Finally, OOB is not the only vulnerability which results
into information leakage capability. Less critical information
leakage vulnerabilities exposes specific pointer values (attacker
cannot choose these pointers) inside memory [17], [16], [18]
and do not provide arbitrary memory disclosure. With such
limited information leakages, attacker can predict segment base
addresses pointed by such pointers because ASLR is based on
page-granularity. However, complete inspection of memory is
not possible which is why attacker utilizes relative heap layout
prediction and various spraying approaches in their exploit.
D. Bypassing Byte-granularity Randomization
Byte granularity heap randomization guarantees four (or
eight) possible cases against any pointer manipulation due
to out-of-bounds access. In turn, an attacker who wishes to
hijack a single pointer (or any word-unit data), say, with a
value of 0x1122334455667788, stands a 87.5% chance
of failing in his/her overwrite attempt with pointer spraying
(i.e., 0x8811223344556677, 0x7788112233445566,
etc). Thus, a plausible way of bypassing byte granularity
randomization is by constructing the entire chain of the exploit
payload with byte-shift-independent values only. A byte-shift-
independent value is a word (or doubleword) composed of the
same bytes (e.g., 0x9797979797979797 in a 64-bit system
or 0x35353535 in a 32-bit system).
At this point, the byte-shift-independent values are always
invalid virtual addresses in current 64-bit system. In 32-bit
system, such values can be predictable and valid address espe-
cially if the attacker allocates a sufficiently large region of the
memory (i.e., allocating the lower 1-GByte of memory in a 32-
bit address space will include an address of 0x35353535).
It could be a threat to byte-granularity heap randomization if
attacker can place the crafted chunk at such address and con-
struct the crafted pointers with byte-shift-independent values.
Virtual addresses such as 0x35343534 make the same effect
with 50% probability. To address this issue, 32-bit version
of RUMA provides configuration for avoiding such addresses
similarly as EMET [40]. The difference between EMET and
32-bit RUMA is that while EMET initially pre-allocate (mmap)
blacklist pages, 32-bit RUMA checks the address at allocation
time and re-allocates the chunk. We compiled 32-bit version
of SPEC2006 suites and tested performance impact of this
algorithm. The algorithm caused up to 3% overhead in 32-
bit SPEC2006 benchmark. Detailed algorithm description for
avoiding such addresses is described in section IV.
III. CASE STUDIES
Quantifying the probability of successful heap vulnerability
exploitation is an arduous process and furthermore, proving
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Fig. 2: Indirect (two-stage) manipulation of backstore pointer using OOB. If the heap segment that has backstore pointer (ptrB)
and OOB accessed heap segment is different (which is likely), the attacker should spray crafted backstore pointers. This approach
is highly dependent on the pointer-width allocation granularity. Byte-granularity allocation breaks this approach with constant
probability.
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Fig. 3: Information leakage steps of CVE-2016-0191.
the correctness of such probability (of successful exploitation)
is practically impossible. Here we summarize case studies
regarding the security effectiveness of byte-granularity heap
randomization based on real-world exploitation analysis. For
the analysis, we investigate publicly disclosed heap memory
corruption vulnerabilities [20], [21], [13], [14], [19], [10], [1],
[2], [8], [11], [7], [22], [15], [5], [6], [25], [23], [24], [12],
[4] that enabled attackers to achieve information leakage or
arbitrary-code-execution against various software mostly from
Pwn2Own contest and Google bug bounty program.
Throughout case studies, four of the attacks which we will
discuss in detail [1], [2], [5], [25] were fully reproduced and
byte-granularity heap randomization was partially applied7.
Rest of the case studies were conducted based on debugging
proof-of-concept attack codes with documented information.
A. Throwing off Pointer Spraying
Throughout cases studies, we observed a number of
pointer spraying attempts for the successful attack. CVE-
2016-0191 exploit extensively repeated spraying the crafted
DataView object to trigger use-after-free. CVE-2016-1857
exploit sprayed crafted pointers to trigger use-after-free
against ArrayProtoType object and hijack function call
for toString(). CVE-2016-5129 sprayed crafted pointers
around the out-of-bounds read heap region from the initial
exploit step. CVE-2015-2411 exploit sprayed fake pointers
around the uninitialized heap chunk of Tree::TextBlock
object to initially trigger the vulnerability. CVE-2016-1653
exploit sprayed extensive amount of Function objects and
hijacked the pointer inside an object using pointer-width allo-
cation granularity.
CVE-2013-2729 sprays a chunk of size 4096 bytes with
fake pointers in it. An integer overflow vulnerability occurs
while parsing a bitmap image embedded in a PDF document,
7Adopting byte-granularity heap randomization to legacy binary is not
fully applicable except old version of Acrobat Reader due to compatibility
issues which will be discussed later. In such case, we applied byte-granularity
randomization only against exploit-relevant objects by identifying the object
based on its size and allocation site for analysis. Details of such issues will
be discussed in section IV
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# CVE # Bug Description Attack Target Remarks
1 CVE-2013-2729 out-of-bound Acrobat Pro (32bit) Pointer Spray
2 CVE-2015-2411 use-before-init IE11 (32bit) Pointer Spray
3 CVE-2016-0191 use-after-free Edge (64bit) Pointer Spray
4 CVE-2016-1653 JIT compiler bug Chrome (32bit) Pointer Spray
5 CVE-2016-1857 use-after-free Safari (32bit) Pointer Spray
6 CVE-2016-5129 out-of-bound Chrome (32bit) Pointer Spray
7 CVE-2012-4792 use-after-free IE8 (32bit) Multiple Pointer Corruption
8 CVE-2013-0025 use-after-free IE8 (32bit) Multiple Pointer Corruption
9 CVE-2014-3176 out-of-bound Chrome (32bit) Multiple Pointer Corruption
10 CVE-2016-0175 use-after-free Windows Kernel Multiple Pointer Corruption
11 CVE-2016-0196 use-after-free Windows Kernel Multiple Pointer Corruption
12 CVE-2016-1017 use-after-free Flash Player Multiple Pointer Corruption
13 CVE-2017-5030 out-of-bound Chrome (64bit) Information Leak Analysis
14 CVE-2015-1234 heap overflow Chrome (32bit) Non-Pointer Corruption
15 CVE-2017-2521 out-of-bound Safari Non-Pointer Corruption
16 CVE-2016-1859 use-after-free Safari Non-Pointer Corruption
17 CVE-2013-0912 type confusion Chrome (32bit) In-bound Corruption
18 CVE-2017-0071 type confusion Edge (64bit) In-bound Corruption
19 CVE-2016-1016 use-after-free Flash Player None
20 CVE-2016-1796 heap overflow OSX Kernel None
TABLE I: Summarized result of case study.
(a) CVE-2013-2729 (b) CVE-2013-0025
Fig. 4: Reproducing CVE-2013-2729 (Acrobat Reader) and CVE-2013-0025 (Internet Explorer) exploitation for case study.
(a) CVE-2012-4792 (b) CVE-2017-5030
Fig. 5: Reproducing CVE-2012-4792 (Internet Explorer) and CVE-2017-5030 (Chrome) exploitation for case study.
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which eventually leads to out-of-bounds heap access. As the
full exploit code is available on the Internet, we reproduced
the entire attack under debugging environment to see how byte
granularity heap randomization hinders the exploitation. The
PoC reliably achieves arbitrary code execution against 32-bit
Acrobat Reader X in Windows 7; however, after we adopt byte-
granularity randomness for heap allocation8, the PoC exploit
constantly crashes due to dereferencing the invalid pointer (in-
correctly aligned due to byte granularity randomization). How-
ever, the program never crashed while processing benign PDF
documents. For example, the debug screen capture Figure 4a
shows an example crash due to out-of-bounds heap pointer
access (ESI is holding an invalid crafted pointer). The value
of ESI is 0xF3070F4C, which is a 1-byte shifted value from
the intended one (0x070F4C33). This occurs because of the
unpredictable change in the pointer-width alignment between
the out-of-bounds buffer and the target heap chunk. Although
this single step of pointer hijacking could be successfully
operated in 25% of the cases, overall attack chance is less
than 1% due to multiple needs of dereferencing out-of-bounds
crafted pointers sprayed inside heap.
B. Throwing off Multiple Pointer Corruption
Some of the case studies often demonstrated that exploits
require multiple pointer corruption. CVE-2016-1017 exploit
required two consecutive triggering of use-after-free pointer
corruption. CVE-2016-0196 required three successive pointer
corruption of use-after-free for the exploit. In the case of CVE-
2012-4792 and CVE-2013-0025, the attacker must construct
a multiple stage chain of crafted pointer dereferencing to
ultimately change the virtual function call. CVE-2014-3176
exploit involves two consecutive pointer corruption of Array
object and ArrayBuffer object to trigger initial memory
read/write capability. CVE-2016-0175 uses two consecutive
triggering of use-after-free. First use-after-free results arbitrary
or operation with a constant number 2, this operation triggers
another use-after-free for secondary heap overflow vulnerabil-
ity.
CVE-2012-4792 use-after-free required chaining two
crafted pointers. The vulnerability is caused by reusing a dan-
gling pointer of CButton object after it has been freed. The
button object referenced by a dangling pointer in CVE-2012-
4792 has a size of 0x86 bytes, and the use-after-free logic
de-references this dangling pointer to retrieve VPTR inside the
object. The exploit should manipulate two consecutive steps
of pointer dereferencing: (i) manipulate V-Table pointer inside
CButton object, (ii) manipulate function pointer inside V-
Table. PoC code fails the first V-Table pointer manipulation
(into test value 0xcafebabe) with 75% probability regard-
less of pointer spray. Figure 5a shows the debugging screen
and memory allocation log trace of Internet Explorer while the
PoC of CVE-2012-4792 is being triggered. From the figure,
the allocation request for the attacker’s data yields memory
address 0x00323bbb (3-byte distance from pointer-width
alignment), which has a different alignment to that of the
dangling pointer 0x00323bba (2-byte distance from pointer-
width alignment). Because of the discrepancy among these
8by hooking the heap allocation APIs in the AcroRd32.dll import address
table
two memory alignments, the manipulated pointer via spraying
becomes 0xbafecab0 which is an unintended pointer.
CVE-2013-0025 is a use-after-free which required chaining
three crafted pointers. Use-after-free in this case requires three
successive manipulation of CParaElement pointer, V-Table
pointer of CParaElement, and function pointer inside the
V-Table. From the debugging screen of Figure 4b, there are
three successive pointer dereferencing before EIP is changed
(e.g., call dword ptr [eax+170h]). The PoC exploit
failed the first step of pointer hijacking “mov esi, [eax],”
which was supposedly aimed at hijacking the pointer of
CParaElement into a test value 0xcafebabe, which is
a sprayed pointer value. At the bottom right of the debugging
screen of Figure 4b, there is an allocation log that reports that
a heap chunk was yielded at 0x047c128a (2-bytes off from
word alignment). However, the value of the dangling pointer
is 0x047c1288 (correct word alignment).
C. Throwing off Information Leak Analysis
Byte-granularity heap randomization hinders the automa-
tion of information leak analysis. Although the attacker can
expose the memory contents via info-leak vulnerability, the at-
tacker needs to interpret the semantics of leaked values. For ex-
ample, if an attacker observes a value such as 0x12345678,
there should be an interpretation for this number (pointer,
length, etc.). Pointer-width allocation granularity significantly
helps this interpretation.
CVE-2017-5030 is an OOB vulnerability which gives
information leakage capability to the attacker. In this vulner-
ability, an attacker can print out the out-of-bounds accessed
heap memory contents directly as float type numbers. Using
this information leakage, the attacker gets useful information
which will be later used. From the exploit codes, we can see
that analyzing the leaked memory contents (is_pointer())
in this attack leverages that heap chunks are always pointer-
width aligned. Information leak analysis routine considers the
leaked memory contents as 8-byte aligned array and examines
the least significant bit of each element. If the least significant
bit is set, attacker interprets the number as a pointer (V8 stores
pointer in this way). Figure 5b Shows memory dump of V8 and
the leaked memory contents from Chrome debugging console
while the exploitation is in progress. From the figure, the
attacker assumes the leaked value 0x000002d2e9106a41
(highlighted with a box) is a pointer; based on the observation
that the least significant byte among the 8-byte is an odd
number. Although this vulnerability could still be exploited
under byte-granularity randomized heap, automation of exploit
becomes difficult.
D. Non-Pointer and In-Bound Corruption
Case study shows that there are attacks based on non-
pointer manipulation or in-bound corruption. In such cases,
byte-granularity heap randomization does not provide addi-
tional effectiveness over existing course-grained heap ran-
domization. CVE-2015-1234 exploit targets corrupting the
size member of an object via race-condition. CVE-2016-
1859 exploit corrupts the length member variable of
GraphicsContext object. In case of CVE-2017-2521, a
JavaScript function setPublicLength fails to check secu-
rity conditions thus allows increasing the length of an object.
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In-bound corruption is a memory corruption vulnerability that
does not cross heap chunk boundary. For example, an object
can have a buffer and other member variables together. In
this case, the distance between the buffer and other member
variable are fixed, regardless of heap randomization. Type
confusion is another example of inbound corruption. CVE-
2013-0912 and CVE-2017-0071 (type confusion vulnerability)
results repeatable arbitrary memory read/write primitive using
in-bound pointer corruption thus unaffected by heap random-
ization granularity.
Rest of the case studies were less affected by the heap
randomization granularity because the vulnerability quickly
achieves complete memory disclosure or the exploitation
regarding pointer corruption is less complicated. Figure 4
summarizes overall case study results.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF BYTE-GRANULARITY
HEAP RANDOMIZATION
As byte-granularity heap randomization inevitably involves
CPU-level unaligned or misaligned memory access, we start
this section by discussing some backgrounds regarding the
unaligned access and analyze our findings in the performance
and compatibility such as the atomicity and the alignment
fault issues involved in the misaligned access. Based on
microbenchmark analysis, we design a new memory allocator
RUMA for efficient byte-granularity randomization. We further
show in-depth testing results on RUMA using various bench-
marks.
A. Unaligned Memory Access
The term alignment can be used with many units such
as page alignment, object alignment, and word alignment.
In this paper, the term alignment specifically refers to the
CPU word granularity alignment. Unaligned memory access
can be observed in special cases in an Intel-based system
(e.g., #pragma pack(1) in the C language, x86 GLIBC
I/O buffer handling). However, memory accesses are always
encouraged to be aligned at multiples of the CPU word
size. The main reason stems from the limited addressing
granularity of the hardware. In general, CPU architectures
feature a memory bus line with 8-byte addressing granularity;
therefore, the retrieval of memory at an unaligned address
requires exceptional handling from the hardware viewpoint.
Handling such unaligned memory access may involve various
performance penalty issues such as a possible delay of store-
load forwarding, cache bank dependency, and cache miss. The
major penalty induced by unaligned memory access is closely
related to the increased number of L1 cache misses. Because
the CPU fetches memory contents from a cache with cache
line granularity, unaligned memory access that crosses the
boundary of two separate cache lines causes both cache lines
to be accessed to retrieve a single word, causing a performance
penalty.
Other than performance, unaligned memory access also
raises concerns regarding memory access atomicity. Atomic
memory access is a critical issue in concurrent software de-
velopment. Multithreaded applications utilize various types of
synchronization primitives such as mutex and semaphore. The
key primitive of critical section (protected by the lock) is that
OS CR0.AM EFLAGS.AC
Windows disabled disabled
Linux enabled disabled
OSX disabled disabled
TABLE II: Default configuration of CR0.AM bit and
EFLAGS.AC bit in major operating systems. Unless two bits
are enabled at the same time, unaligned access does not raise
an alignment fault under the Intel architecture.
Configuration # of Page-Faults # of Cache-Miss
Fully Aligned 45 7,647
Breaking Cache Line 46 7,527
Breaking Page Border 45 76,181
TABLE III: PERF benchmark revealed the reason of excep-
tionally high performance penalty of unaligned memory access
that crosses the border of two pages, which is the increased
cache miss.
the execution should be atomic from the perspective of each
thread. Unaligned access raises concerns when the application
uses thread synchronization, lock-free algorithms, or lock-free
data structures, which relies on instruction-level atomicity such
as the InterlockedCompareExchange() function. Be-
cause single unaligned memory access can split into multiple
accesses at the hardware level, the atomicity of memory access
may not be guaranteed.
In fact, ARM architecture does not support such atomicity
for unaligned access. Even recently, compare-and-swap (CAS)
instructions in ARM (e.g., ldrex, strex) fail to operate if
the target memory operand is unaligned. This is the major
reason we conclude byte-granularity heap randomization is
yet infeasible in ARM architecture. However, Intel microar-
chitecture (since P6) supports atomicity for such instructions
even if the memory address is arbitrarily misaligned [47].
For example, CAS instructions of Intel ISA (e.g., lock
cmpxchg) maintains memory access atomicity in all cases.
The Intel official manual states that atomicity of lock is
supported to arbitrarily misaligned memory.
Another important issue regarding unaligned memory ac-
cess is the alignment fault. An alignment fault (which raises
SIGBUS signal in Linux) occurs in the event of unaligned data
memory access, depending on the CPU configuration. There
are two configuration flags regarding the alignment fault in
the Intel architecture, namely the AM bit in the system CR0
register and the AC bit in the EFLAGS register. Unless such
bits are enabled together, Intel architecture does not raise an
alignment fault. Table II summarizes the default configuration
of these registers in well-known operating systems.
However, there is an exception that raises an alignment
fault regardless of such configuration. In the case of the Intel
SSE [32] instruction set, an instruction such as MOVNTQDA
raises an alignment fault if the target memory operand address
is misaligned at a 16-byte boundary. Normally, an arbitrary
heap memory address has no guarantee to be 16 byte aligned
in general. Therefore, codes that use SSE instruction do not
assume that the given memory address for SSE operand
will be 16-byte aligned. The pre-processing codes of SSE
instruction checks the address alignment and properly handles
the 128-bit misaligned memory portion. However, some of
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Fig. 6: Instruction-level microbenchmark result for Intel i7-6500 (SkyLake). The Y-axis represents the time (consumed seconds)
for repeatedly executing the unrolled instructions 134,217,728 (0x8000000) times. A stands for Aligned access, U stands for
Unaligned access inside cache line, BC stands for unaligned access on Border of (L1) Cache line, BP stands for unaligned access
on Border of Pages. We ran the same benchmark for additional 9 Intel CPUs (Core-i5, Xeon, and so forth) and verified similar
results in all cases.
Fig. 7: Size distribution of allocated heap objects in Internet Explorer 8 and Adobe Acrobat Reader X.
the compiler optimization cases (e.g., Clang -O3) predicts the
chunk alignment and raises problem. We discuss more details
regarding this issue with the compatibility experiment analysis.
B. Microbenchmark for Unaligned Access
Unaligned access is often observed under Intel-based
system. In recent Intel microarchitectures, the performance
penalty of unaligned access is being reduced since Ne-
halem [54]. Here, we show microbenchmark results regarding
unaligned access in recent Intel CPUs. All the per-instruction
benchmarks are composed of assembly code only, thus avoid-
ing any compiler dependency. We used ten different Intel x86-
64 CPUs and measured the execution time of 134,217,728
(0x8000000) iterations for memory access instructions.
Performance measurement for instruction is dependent on
CPU pipeline state. To make the worst-case CPU pipeline,
we used the same instruction for 48 consecutive times and
repeated such 48 consecutive execution using a loop. The loop
was composed of dec ecx and jnz, both of which have
lower instruction latency and reciprocal throughput compared
to the memory access instructions. This configuration makes
the worst-case CPU pipeline for memory access. Figure 6
shows the overall results. In the benchmark, only the register
and memory were used as target operands (the immediates
were not used since the instruction latency was lower).
Throughout the evaluation we have discovered that the
performance penalty of unaligned access is severely biased
by rare cases, Figure 6 is one of the experiment results. In
particular, the performance penalty of unaligned access is 0%
if the accesses have entirely occurred inside the cache line. In
case the unaligned access broke the L1 cache line, the per-
formance penalty raised up to 30–70%. In case the unaligned
access broke the border of two 4-KByte pages, the performance
penalty was suspiciously high (marked as red in the figure).
In the case of REP-based instructions (REP counter value is
256), the performance penalty of unaligned access was mostly
20–30%. To investigate the reason for the exceptionally high-
performance penalty of unaligned access that crosses page
border, we further used the PERF [31] benchmark and found
that the dominant factor is the increased cache miss. Table III
summarizes the PERF benchmark conducted on the Intel i7-
6700 Ubuntu14.04 Server in a 64-bit environment.
Thus far, the microbenchmark in Figure 6, suggests the
performance penalty of unaligned access in modern Intel
9
CPU OS Compiler and Library Environment Penalty Alignment Handling IfAA/IfUA
Intel i7-6700 Windows 10 VS2015 vcruntime140.dll (32bit) 5% yes REP/REP
Intel i7-6700 Windows 10 VS2015 (64bit) 15% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i7-4980 Windows 8.1 VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (32bit) -20% yes SSE/REP
Intel i7-4980 Windows 8.1 VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (64bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i7-4980 Ubuntu 15.10 GCC 5.2.1 glibc-2.21 (32bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i7-4980 Ubuntu 15.10 GCC 5.2.1 glibc-2.21 (64bit) 0% yes REP/REP
Intel i7-4980 Ubuntu 14.04 GCC 4.8.4 glibc2.19 (32bit) 10% yes REP/SSE
Intel i7-4980 Ubuntu 14.04 GCC 4.8.4 glibc2.19 (64 bit) 5% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i7-4980 OSX El Capitan Apple LLVM 7.3 (32bit) 0% yes SSE/REP
Intel i7-4980 OSX El Capitan Apple LLVM 7.3 (64 bit) 5% yes REP/REP
Intel i7-3770 Ubuntu 16.04 GCC 5.4.0 glibc-2.23 (64bit) 0% yes REP/REP
Intel i5-3570 Fedora20 GCC 4.8.2 glibc-2.18 (64bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i5-3570 Debian7.5 GCC 4.7.2 glibc-2.13 (64bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i5-3570 FreeBSD9.1 (32bit) GCC 4.2.1 bsdlibc (32bit) 100% no REP/REP
Intel i5-760 Ubuntu 12.04 Server GCC 4.6.3 (32bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i5-760 Ubuntu 12.04 Server GCC 4.6.3 (64bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
Intel i5-760 Windows 7 VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (32bit) 50% yes SSE/REP
Intel i5-760 Windows 7 VS2010 msvcr100d.dll (64bit) 0% yes SSE/SSE
TABLE IV: Unaligned access penalty (in running time) of various memcpy implementations for 1-Mbyte buffer. “IfAA” stands
for: Instruction used for Aligned Address. “IfUA” stands for: Instruction used for Unaligned Address.
architecture is high only when the access crosses the border
of two cache lines, and extremely high if the access crosses
two-page boundaries.
C. RUMA
According to the cycle-level instruction benchmark, un-
aligned access in L1 cache line border and page border hin-
dered the performance. To avoid such memory access while en-
abling byte-granularity heap randomization, we implemented
a byte-granularity randomized heap allocator suited for Intel
architecture, namely Randomly Unaligned Memory Allocator
(RUMA). The goal of this allocator is to randomize the heap
chunk location with byte granularity while minimizing the
unaligned memory access occurs at the border of L1 cache line
and page boundary. We implemented RUMA as part of Clang
runtime, and wrote an LLVM pass for automated allocator
substitution.
To break the pointer-width allocation granularity, RUMA
additionally allocates sizeof(void*) additional memory
space in addition to original allocation request size to re-
serve sizeof(void*) dummy space. After the allocation
algorithm selects the proper location for the new chunk,
RUMA yields the address which is randomly increased in
bytes between zero and sizeof(void*)-1. We not that
the frontend implementation (adding random numbers) for
applying byte-granularity randomization is a simple task and
not our main contribution. The main contribution of RUMA is
minimizing the impact of byte-granularity randomness based
on the previously discussed analysis and experiments.
The backend allocation algorithm of RUMA is mainly
based on jemalloc, where the heap space is organized
as multiple pools each holding objects of certain size class.
However, RUMA considers two special cases: (i) chunk size
less than L1 cache line width, (ii) chunk size bigger than
L1 cache line less than page size. The size of L1 cache
line (usually 64-byte or 128-byte) is dynamically calculated
during the allocator initialization and page size is statically
assumed to be 4KB. Once the allocation size is determined,
RUMA searches for an available chunk based on jemalloc
algorithm with additional constraints that minimize the cases
where chunks are spanning across special memory borders.
For object allocation smaller than L1 cache line size
(including the additional space for randomization), RUMA
guarantees the memory location of the chunk to fit between
two L1 cache line borders thus eliminate any performance
penalty due to byte-granularity heap randomization. In case
the requested size is bigger than L1 cache line and yet smaller
than page, RUMA places the chunk between page boundaries
therefore avoid page boundary access. If the allocation size
is bigger than a page, there is no additional handling as
baseline allocator guarantees minimal border access without
any additional handling.
In case the application is 32-bit, RUMA uses address
filtering algorithm to handle the case of byte-shift-independant-
pointers section II which could bypass RUMA. In case the
requested chunk size is larger than 0x01010101 bytes, it
is impossible to remove the byte-shift-independent address
from the virtual address mapping. However, in case the size
is smaller than 0x01010101 bytes, 32-bit RUMA ensures
there would be no byte-shift-independent address inside the
allocated chunk. The address checking algorithm is executed
after the chunk selection and right before delivering the chunk
to the application. If the chunk includes 32-bit byte-shift-
independent address (e.g., 0x11111111), RUMA keeps the
chunk internally and allocate a new chunk. The algorithm for
address inspection is as follow: (i) Calculate most-significant-
byte (MSB) of chunk start address. For example, if the chunk
address is 0x12345678, MSB is 0x12. (ii) Check if MSB-
only address (e.g., 0x12121212) is in between chunk start
and end. (iii) Increase MSB by one and repeat step (i), and
(ii).
Overall, the efficacy of RUMA would be optimal when all
objects are small (less than L1 cache-line would be ideal).
In reality, however, there are large heap objects. As the
size of an object becomes bigger, the chance of having a
costly unaligned access will increase even though RUMA
minimizes the occurrence of unaligned access. To investigate
the chunk size distribution in common applications in general,
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Benchmark Libc RUMA ottomalloc jemalloc tcmalloc # Allocs
perlbench 264 263 330 259 252 358,141,317
bzip2 424 434 420 421 417 168
gcc 242 238 318 231 233 28,458,531
mcf 200 202 196 195 197 3
gobmk 403 413 407 405 404 656,924
hmmer 344 386 344 348 349 2,474,260
sjeng 407 423 406 413 407 4
libquantum 354 356 352 353 353 179
h264ref 440 529 441 440 447 177,764
omnetpp 270 217 284 211 218 267,158,621
astar 325 316 306 310 307 4,799,953
xalancbmk 172 145 228 130 122 135,155,546
Total (geomean) 100.0% 99.7% 106.5% 94.8% 94.3%
(a) Execution Time (sec)
Benchmark Libc RUMA
perlbench 648 631
bzip2 832 835
gcc 865 868
mcf 1638 1646
gobmk 29 37
hmmer 26 32
sjeng 172 178
libquantum 95 105
h264ref 64 80
omnetpp 168 177
astar 321 367
xalancbmk 413 517
Total (geomean) 100% 110.38%
(b) Memory consumption (MB)
TABLE V: SPEC2006 benchmark results. Various allocators (including RUMA) are applied to each program. While other
allocators respect word-alignment for all chunks, RUMA randomizes the chunk location with byte-granularity.
requests/sec
Average Standard deviation
Original 31362.20 565.90
Patched 31201.65 506.24
TABLE VI: Performance impact of the Nginx patch.
we traced heap allocation and deallocation requests of Acrobat
Reader and Internet Explorer. Figure 7 shows the object size
distribution of live chunks when Acrobat Reader and Internet
Explorer are running. The results are based on allocation/deal-
location/reallocation call trace. The left side graph in the figure
is the result of Internet Explorer after rendering the Google
index page, and the right side graph is the result of Adobe
Reader after rendering an ordinary PDF document.
Figure 7 suggests that average heap chunk sizes are usually
small. Byte granularity heap randomization using RUMA can
fully avoid unaligned access penalty if all chunks are smaller
than L1 cache line length. In case the chunk is larger than
L1 cache line, it is inevitable to place a chunk across two
cache lines. In general, large heap chunks are requested to
allocate buffers that are often accessed by bulk-memory access
APIs such as memcpy. To verify the detailed impact of byte-
granularity heap randomization against memory intensive APIs
and large buffers, we analyzed various versions of memcpy
implementations and conducted experiments. In particular, we
ran 100,000 iterations of 1-Mbyte memory copy operation
using memcpy and compare the execution time between two
cases: (i) source and destination addresses of 1-Mbyte buffer
are word-aligned, (ii) source and destination addresses of the
buffer is not word-aligned (byte-aligned). This experiment is
NOT designed to measure the performance of unaligned access
at the instruction level. Rather, the purpose of this experiment
is to measure the performance impact and compatibility of
unaligned access against bulk memory access APIs. Table IV
summarizes the results.
In Table IV, the performance penalty is negligible in most
cases. However, a severe performance penalty is observed from
the case of i5-3570 FreeBSD 9.1; and ironically, the case of i7-
4980 Windows 8.1 shows negative performance penalty. The
cause of such peculiar results can be explained by the fact
that memcpy chooses a different version of implementation at
runtime, depending on various parameters such as the address
alignment, CPU features, size of the buffer, and so forth.
Aside from the case of FreeBSD 9.1, all version of memcpy
implementation detected the unaligned address and optimized
the performance by changing the alignment to be aligned
before beginning the actual memory access.
D. SPEC2006 Benchmark
To measure the performance impact and memory usage
of RUMA under memory intensive environment, we use
SPEC2006. The SPEC2006 benchmark suite did not suffer
compatibility problem after we applied RUMA. However, mea-
suring the performance impact of RUMA should be carefully
conducted because existing software conventionally assume
word granularity heap alignment, therefore some code could
show unexpected behavior. In addition, the program might
use multiple allocators or custom allocators thus render the
experiment inaccurate.
Before applying RUMA allocator, we analyzed the source
code of each benchmark suite to verify if the application is
suited for the experiment. In case of 400.perlbench, custom
heap allocator (Perl_safemalloc) was used depending on
the build configuration parameters. However, we confirmed
that under our build configuration, the benchmark used default
glibc allocator (malloc). Similarly, 403.gcc had multiple
custom allocators (xmalloc and obstack) but we checked
that under our build-environment, glibc allocator was used
(obstack internally used xmalloc, xmalloc internally
used glibc allocator). Other benchmark suites had no partic-
ular issues. All benchmark suite programs were also dynami-
cally analyzed to confirm how many heap chunks are affected.
To change the allocator of SPEC2006, we made an
LLVM pass Ruma and used replaceAllUsesWith LLVM
API to replace glibc C/C++ allocators such as malloc,
free, _Znwj, and _ZdlPv. To measure the performance
impact, we applied RUMA as well as other open-source
allocators to SPEC2006. The open-source allocators we
used are dlmalloc (glibc), tcmalloc, jemalloc, and
ottomalloc. The benchmark was conducted the under
following environment: Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2630 CPU with
128GB RAM, Linux 4.4.0 x86-64 and Ubuntu 16.04. We used
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the glibc allocator as the baseline of performance. Table V
summarizes the results.
V. COMPATIBILITY ANALYSIS OF BYTE-GRANULARITY
HEAP RANDOMIZATION
Modern software and system implementations often as-
sume and require the heap allocation alignment to be word
aligned. Breaking this assumption can affect existing software
in various aspects. In order to adopt byte-granularity heap
randomization as practical defense, implementation conflicts
regarding heap alignment should be addressed. To analyze the
compatibility issues of byte-granularity heap randomization,
we conducted experiments with various applications/bench-
marks. Table VII summarizes the analysis results regarding
various compatibility issues.
A. Coreutils
After substituting Coreutils [42] glibc allocator to RUMA,
we ran the Coreutils test suite to see if there are com-
patibility issues. In our initial experiment, 56 out of 476
Coreutils test cases did not pass the test. It turned out that
programs using the following APIs crashed during execution:
strdup, strndup, getline, getdelim, asprintf,
vasprintf, realpath, getcwd. After analyzing the root
cause, we found that the reason was irrelevant to the byte-
level allocation granularity. While our LLVM pass replaces
the allocator calls in Coreutils, allocator calls inside libc
remained. Since the above-mentioned libc APIs internally
use default glibc allocator, two allocators has conflicted. To
handle this issue, we ported such APIs to use RUMA allocator
and extended the LLVM pass to replace such API calls as
well. After porting the above-mentioned APIs for RUMA, all
programs passed the test without causing any compatibility
issues.
B. Nginx
We ran Nginx test suite after applying RUMA allocator. In
our initial experiment, none of the 324 nginx-tests suite
passed the check. According to our analysis, the root cause
of the problem was the implicit assumption of heap chunk
alignment in Nginx implementation. Because the code assumes
that any heap object will be word-aligned, on some occasions
the program chose to store boolean information inside the
least significant bit (LSB) of pointers, perhaps for performance
reason. That is, instead of declaring a boolean member in a
structure or class, the boolean value is saved in the LSB of
the object pointer.
Listing 1: Representative parts of the Nginx patch. LSB storage
is replaced by a new member in ngx_connection_s.
diff --git a/src/core/ngx_connection.h b/src/core
/ngx_connection.h
index e4dfe58..5c15ca2 100644
--- a/src/core/ngx_connection.h
+++ b/src/core/ngx_connection.h
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ typedef enum {
struct ngx_connection_s {
+ unsigned instance:1;
void *data;
ngx_event_t *read;
ngx_event_t *write;
diff --git a/src/event/modules/ngx_epoll_module.c
b/src/event/modules/ngx_epoll_module.c
index 76aee08..da948f2 100644
--- a/src/event/modules/ngx_epoll_module.c
+++ b/src/event/modules/ngx_epoll_module.c
@@ -618,7 +620,8 @@ ngx_epoll_add_event(
ngx_event_t *ev, ngx_int_t event, ngx_uint_t
flags)
#endif
ee.events = events | (uint32_t) flags;
- ee.data.ptr = (void *) ((uintptr_t) c | ev->
instance);
+ c->instance = ev->instance;
+ ee.data.ptr = c;
ngx_log_debug3(NGX_LOG_DEBUG_EVENT, ev->log,
0,
"epoll add event: fd:%d op:%d
ev:%08XD",
@@ -836,8 +841,7 @@ ngx_epoll_process_events(
ngx_cycle_t *cycle, ngx_msec_t timer,
ngx_uint_t flags)
for (i = 0; i < events; i++) {
c = event_list[i].data.ptr;
- instance = (uintptr_t) c & 1;
- c = (ngx_connection_t *) ((uintptr_t) c
& (uintptr_t) ˜1);
+ instance = c->instance;
rev = c->read;
To handle this compatibility problem, we patched the
Nginx-1.13.12 source code as shown in Listing 1. Af-
ter the patch, all test suite passed the check. To evaluate
the performance impact of RUMA-compatible modification
against Nginx, we benchmarked the request throughput using
wrk [44]. The benchmark was repeated 10 times for each
case. Table VI summarizes the benchmark result. According
to the benchmark, no significant performance degradation was
introduced by the modification.
C. ChakraCore
ChakraCore revealed interesting compatibility issues of
byte-granularity heap randomization. We applied RUMA to
ChakraCore then ran the standard test suite provided by the
ChakraCore. The initial result indicated that all test cases failed
to pass the check with the same error. The failure seemed
irrelevant to the test case. We found that the initialization
of ChakraCore JSRuntime accessed RUMA-affected chunk,
however, the -O3 optimization of Clang aggressively assumed
the alignment of the heap chunk (assuming it would be 128-
bit aligned) then used SSE instructions that require specific
memory alignment such as movaps for fast execution. After
changing the optimization level to -O0, 351 over 2,638 test
cases (interpreted variant) failed to pass the check.
Among the failures, 172 cases were caused due to SSE
instruction alignment fault and 176 cases failed due to the
assertion failure that explicitly requires word alignment for
heap pointers before further operation. Interestingly, three
cases failed due to time-out. After further analysis, we found
that the failure was due to futex system call failure. Unlike
pthread mutex, which is based on user-level lock pre-
fixed instructions, the futex is based on Linux kernel system
call which requires word-aligned address for its parameter.
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Application # failures Remarks
Coreutils 0/476 56 cases initially failed due to allocator substitution problem (fixed later)
Nginx 324/324 All cases failed due to least significant bit (LSB) of pointer utilization issue
Nginx (patched) 0/324 Re-factorization of LSB pointer issue made Nginx fully compatible
ChakraCore 172/2,638 Alignment Fault while using SSE (MOVAPS)
ChakraCore 176/2,638 Assertion failure (alignment check)
ChakraCore 3/2,638 Futex system call failure (unaligned parameter)
TABLE VII: Compatibility Analysis Summary.
Because of this, the test suite failed to operate correctly
as the system call raised an error. After finding this issue,
we investigated the current (4.x) Linux kernel system calls
to find a similar case. The futex was the only one that
caused the problem with byte-granularity heap randomization.
Overall compatibility analysis indicates that byte-granularity
heap randomization requires high deployment cost.
VI. LIMITATION
RUMA for ARM. The performance impact of unaligned
access is a serious issue for RISC processors such as ARM.
In general, unaligned memory access is strongly discouraged
in RISC architectures9. In fact, ARM architecture started to
support hardware-level unaligned access for some instructions
(e.g., LDR) since ARMv6 [38]. To investigate the feasibility
of byte-granularity heap randomization in ARM, we conducted
per-instruction memory access benchmark against Cortex-A9
and Cortex-A17. Table VIII summarizes the result. According
to our analysis, ARM architecture since ARMv6 indeed sup-
ports hardware level unaligned access. However, the support
is for only two memory access instructions (LDR, STR) and
high-performance penalty is observed at every 8-byte address
border regardless of L1 cache or page size. Instructions such as
LDM shows over 10,000% performance penalty for unaligned
access. The reason for such high penalty is due to the lack of
hardware support. Since the hardware is incapable of executing
LDM with unaligned memory operand, hardware raises fault
signal and kernel emulates the instruction. In case of the VLDR,
even emulation is not supported by the kernel. Therefore the
execution fails on unaligned memory operand. Most impor-
tantly, unaligned memory operand does not support LDREX
instruction which is required for instruction level atomicity. For
such reasons, ARM based system is inappropriate to consider
byte-granularity heap randomization at this point.
Side Channel Attack. With byte-granularity heap ran-
domization, heap pointers do not follow word-granularity. In
average, 75% of heap pointers are not word-aligned. Assuming
if the attacker is somehow able to measure the performance of
dereferencing heap pointers precisely, she might be able to tell
that some of them are misaligned around particular memory
border. For example, the attacker can guess that a heap pointer
is spanning across page boundaries while being unaligned if
the access speed is relatively slow. So far, we fail to find any
useful attack scenario by identifying such pointers. However,
in theory, this can be considered as a potential side channel
attack against byte-granularity heap randomization.
Implementation Conflicts. The adoption of byte-
granularity heap randomization creates various implementation
9PowerPC architecture can have 4,000% penalty in the worst case of
unaligned access [26].
conflicts as discussed in section V. One of the major cases
among them is the use of LSB portion of heap pointer
assuming the pointer is word-aligned. In section V, we used
Nginx for discussion; however we also found this issue in
other applications as well. For example, Internet Explorer 11
uses the same implementation approach to mark the chunk type
(Isolation Heap). Any programming techniques that rely on the
assumption that the heap chunk has specific alignment cannot
be applied with byte-granularity heap randomization at the
same time. In addition, futex is currently incompatible with
RUMA as it require word-aligned address (other 4.x Linux
system calls are not affected by alignment). Admittedly, the
implementation compatibility issues are the major limitation
for adopting byte-granularity heap randomization in practice as
it requires significant engineering effort. However, we believe
this is not a fundamental limitation that undermines the worth
our research.
Information Disclosure using Byte-shift-independent
Non-pointer Values. Byte granularity heap randomization
imposes difficulty of hijacking pointers by breaking the
sizeof(void*) allocation granularity of randomized chunk
allocation. As the result of byte granularity randomness, an
attacker cannot leverage pointer spraying technique for by-
passing the randomized memory layout. The only option for
reliable attack (other than information disclosure) is to rely on
byte-shift-independent values, which make it hard (if not im-
possible with careful heap management) to craft valid pointers.
But this is not the case for byte-shift-independent non-pointer
values, which can allow an attacker to craft reliable memory
corruption as intended and then escalate the attack further. A
representative example would be string length corruption [9],
[3] mentioned earlier in the paper section II.
VII. RELATED WORK
HeapTaichi. [39] shows various heap spraying techniques
that leverage the allocation granularity of memory allocators.
For example, if allocation granularity is fixed, an attacker can
split nop-sleds into several pieces and stitch them together with
jump instructions. HeapTaichi claimed that reduced allocation
granularity in heap randomization is better for security. How-
ever, the minimal allocation granularity considered in Heap-
Taichi is pointer-width. Although HeapTaichi discussed in-
depth heap allocation granularity issues, no discussion regard-
ing byte-granularity allocation and its ramification regarding
security/performance was made.
Address Space Layout Permutation. [50] adopts a high
degree of randomness compared to the existing ASLR and also
performs fine-grained permutation against the stack, heap, and
other memory mapped regions. Heap randomization is not the
main theme of this work. However, the paper includes descrip-
tions regarding fine-grained heap randomization. To adopt fine-
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Architecture Instruction Penalty Remarks
Cortex-A9 LDR/STR 100% penalty occurs at 8-byte border
Cortex-A9 LDRB/STRB 0% no penalty
Cortex-A9 LDM/STM over 40,000% penalty always occurs, kernel emulation
Cortex-A9 LDM/STM (ThumbEE) 7,000% penalty always occurs, kernel emulation
Cortex-A9 (,A17) VLDR/VSTR N/A alignment fault
Cortex-A9 (,A17) LDREX/STREX N/A alignment fault (no atomicity)
Cortex-A17 LDR 100% penalty occurs on 8-byte border
Cortex-A17 STR 50% penalty occurs on 8-byte border
Cortex-A17 LDM/STM over 2,000% penalty always occurs, kernel emulation
TABLE VIII: Per-instruction benchmark against ARM CPUs. The benchmark methodology is same to the Intel version.
grained address permutation for a heap, a random (but page-
aligned) virtual address between 0 and 3 GB (assuming 32bit
memory space) is selected for the start of the heap. Afterwards,
a random value between 0 and 4 KB is added to this address
to achieve sub-page randomization. According to this method,
heap pointers should have random byte-level alignment, which
involves unaligned access problem. However, discussion re-
garding unaligned access (due to byte-level randomization)
or the security effectiveness of byte-granularity randomization
was not discussed despite ASLP covered a broad range of fine-
grained randomization issues.
Address Space Randomization. [43] introduced fine-
grained Address Space Randomization (ASR) for various OS-
level components including heap object allocation. In this
work, heap layout is effectively randomized by prepending
random size padding for each object and permuting the
sequence of allocated objects. The paper comprehensively
explores various memory layout randomization strategies and
propose various ideas regarding live re-randomization. They
implement each randomization policies by patching the ker-
nel and dynamic loader, or using binary code translation
techniques. However, the security and performance impact
regarding byte-level memory layout randomization is not the
main interest of the paper. The main focus of the paper is
comprehensive OS-level ASR and live re-randomization with
a minimal performance penalty.
Data Structure Randomization. Data Structure Layout
Randomization (DSLR) [51] randomizes the heap object layout
by inserting dummy members and permuting the sequence of
each member variables inside an object at compilation time.
The size of randomly inserted garbage member variable is mul-
tiple of sizeof(void*) thus respecting CPU alignment.
The goal of DSLR is to diversify the kernel object layouts
to hinder the kernel object manipulation attack performed by
rootkits; in addition to thwarting the system fingerprinting and
kernel object manipulation attack which relies on object layout
information.
Cling. The isolation heap protection approach separates the
heap into the independent area so that objects are allocated
at different parts depending on their types. Indeed, these
approaches can be observed in both academia and industry.
Cling [34] identifies the call site of a heap chunk allocation
request by looking into the call stack. If the chunk allocation
request originates from the same call site, Cling considers the
type of heap chunk to be the same, which indicates that it is
safe to reuse the same heap area for those chunk requests.
If the type is assumed to be different from two allocation
requests, Cling does not allow the heap area to be reused
between those requests. In practice, the heap isolation methods
can frequently be observed in various security-critical software
such as Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Adobe Flash [29].
Other Heap Randomization Approaches. Incorporating
randomization into heap allocation has been discussed in
numerous previous works. Some approaches, such as those
of Bhatkar et al. and Qin et al., respectively randomize the
base address of the heap, as shown in [36], [53]. Others ran-
domize the size of the heap chunks, word-granularity location,
allocation sequence and so forth [49], [48], [37], [35], [52],
[55], [46]. From all these heap fortifications works including
our paper, the purpose in adopting the notion as well as the
implementation differs from each other. The advancement from
previous works is that we show how byte-granularity heap
randomization mitigates crafted pointer spray, then design an
allocator that optimizes performance cost of byte-granularity
heap randomization. Instead of locating the heap chunk at
memory location unpredictable by an attacker, byte granular-
ity heap randomization aim to obstruct heap exploits which
require pointer-width allocation granularity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed byte-granularity heap random-
ization and discussed its efficacy in various aspects. At first
glance, breaking the randomization granularity from word
to byte can be considered trivial. However, this seemingly
insignificant change in granularity opened up a surprising
number of research issues. One of a skeptical matter is that it
hinders the word-aligned performance optimization at the CPU
level. To overcome such problem, we introduce RUMA: an
allocator optimized for byte-granularity heap randomization.
The design of RUMA leverages recent advancement of CPU
architectures for handling the misaligned access. To over-
come the misalignment problem of byte-granularity, RUMA
considers particular allocation sites regarding cache line. We
implemented RUMA as part of Clang runtime for various
evaluations. The performance cost of RUMA’s randomization
for SPEC2006 is around 5% on average compared to other
allocators without randomization.
REFERENCES
[1] CVE-2012-4792. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2012-4792. ie Use-After-Free Vulnerability.
[2] CVE-2013-0025. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2012-4792. ie Use After Free Vulnerability.
[3] CVE-2013-0634. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2013-0634. Flash ByteArray Out-of-bound.
14
[4] CVE-2013-0912. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?
id=180763. V8 Type Casting Error.
[5] CVE-2013-2729. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2013-2729. Integer overflow in Adobe Reader.
[6] CVE-2014-3176. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2014-3176. V8 vulnerability.
[7] CVE-2015-1234. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2015-1234. Chrome buffer overflow.
[8] CVE-2015-2411. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2015-2411. Internet Explorer Memory Corruption Vulnerability.
[9] CVE-2015-8651. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2015-8651. Flash Vector Out-of-bound Access.
[10] CVE-2016-0175. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-0175. Win32k Information Leak.
[11] CVE-2016-0191. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-0191. Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability.
[12] CVE-2016-0196. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-0196. Win32k Vulnerability.
[13] CVE-2016-1016. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1016. Use-after-free in Flash.
[14] CVE-2016-1017. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1017. Use-after-free in Flash.
[15] CVE-2016-1653. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1653. Windows OLE Vulnerability.
[16] CVE-2016-1665. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1665. Information leak in V8.
[17] CVE-2016-1677. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1677. Type confusion in V8.
[18] CVE-2016-1686. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1686. Out-of-bounds read in PDFium.
[19] CVE-2016-1796. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1796. OSX heap corruption.
[20] CVE-2016-1857. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1857. heap corruption in safari.
[21] CVE-2016-1859. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-1859. use-after-free in Safari.
[22] CVE-2016-5129. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2016-5129. Memory corruption in V8.
[23] CVE-2017-0071. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2017-0071. Chakra Heap Corruption.
[24] CVE-2017-2521. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2017-2521. Webkit Out-of-bound Access.
[25] CVE-2017-5030. https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=
CVE-2017-5030. Out-of-bounds in V8.
[26] DEVELOPER WORKS, I. Data alignment: Straighten up and fly right.
https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/pa-dalign/.
[27] Ecmascript language specification. http://www.ecma-international.org/
publications/files/ECMA-ST/Ecma-262.pdf.
[28] Google Project Zero. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/07/
one-perfect-bug-exploiting-type 20.html.
[29] Isolated heap for internet explorer. http://
blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/
isolated-heap-for-internet-explorer-helps-mitigate-uaf-exploits/.
[30] MITRE. https://cve.mitre.org. Common vulnerabilities and exposures.
[31] Performance Counters for Linux. http://lwn.net/Articles/310176/.
[32] Streaming SIMD Extensions. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Streaming SIMD Extensions&oldid=704130503.
[33] What is good memory corruption. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.
kr/2015/06/what-is-good-memory-corruption.html.
[34] AKRITIDIS, P. Cling: A Memory Allocator to Mitigate Dangling
Pointers. In USENIX Security Symposium (2010), pp. 177–192.
[35] BERGER, E. D., AND ZORN, B. G. DieHard: probabilistic memory
safety for unsafe languages. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices (2006), vol. 41,
ACM, pp. 158–168.
[36] BHATKAR, S., DUVARNEY, D. C., AND SEKAR, R. Address Obfus-
cation: An Efficient Approach to Combat a Broad Range of Memory
Error Exploits. In USENIX Security (2003), vol. 3, pp. 105–120.
[37] BHATKAR, S., DUVARNEY, D. C., AND SEKAR, R. Efficient Tech-
niques for Comprehensive Protection from Memory Error Exploits. In
Usenix Security (2005).
[38] BRASH, D. The ARM Architecture Version 6 (ARMv6), Jan. 2002,
ARM White Paper, ARM Ltd., Cambridge UK.
[39] DING, Y., WEI, T., WANG, T., LIANG, Z., AND ZOU, W. Heap taichi:
exploiting memory allocation granularity in heap-spraying attacks.
In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference (2010), ACM, pp. 327–336.
[40] DORMANN, W. What is Microsoft EMET and Why Should I Care?
Tech. rep., DTIC Document, 2014.
[41] FOG, A. The microarchitecture of Intel, AMD and VIA CPUs/An
optimization guide for assembly programmers and compiler makers,
2012.
[42] FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION. Coreutils. http://www.gnu.org/
software/coreutils/coreutils.html.
[43] GIUFFRIDA, C., KUIJSTEN, A., AND TANENBAUM, A. S. Enhanced
Operating System Security Through Efficient and Fine-grained Address
Space Randomization. In USENIX Security Symposium (2012), pp. 475–
490.
[44] GLOZER, W. Modern HTTP benchmarking tool. https://github.com/
wg/wrk.
[45] GORENC, B., HARIRI, A.-A., AND ZUCKERBRAUN, S. Understanding
weaknesses within Internet Explorer’s Isolated Heap and MemoryPro-
tection. Black Hat USA (2015).
[46] HALLER, I., VAN DER KOUWE, E., GIUFFRIDA, C., AND BOS, H.
METAlloc: Efficient and comprehensive metadata management for
software security hardening. In Proceedings of the 9th European
Workshop on System Security (2016), ACM, p. 5.
[47] INTEL. Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developers Manual
Volume 2 (2A, 2B, 2C & 2D): Instruction Set Reference, A-Z.
[48] IYER, V., KANITKAR, A., DASGUPTA, P., AND SRINIVASAN, R.
Preventing overflow attacks by memory randomization. In Software
Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), 2010 IEEE 21st International Sympo-
sium on (2010), IEEE, pp. 339–347.
[49] KHARBUTLI, M., JIANG, X., SOLIHIN, Y., VENKATARAMANI, G.,
AND PRVULOVIC, M. Comprehensively and efficiently protecting the
heap. In ACM Sigplan Notices (2006), vol. 41, ACM, pp. 207–218.
[50] KIL, C., JUN, J., BOOKHOLT, C., XU, J., AND NING, P. Address
space layout permutation (ASLP): Towards fine-grained randomization
of commodity software. In Computer Security Applications Conference,
2006. ACSAC’06. 22nd Annual (2006), IEEE, pp. 339–348.
[51] LIN, Z., RILEY, R., AND XU, D. Polymorphing Software by Ran-
domizing Data Structure Layout. In DIMVA (2009), vol. 9, Springer,
pp. 107–126.
[52] NOVARK, G., AND BERGER, E. D. DieHarder: securing the heap. In
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communi-
cations security (2010), ACM, pp. 573–584.
[53] QIN, F., TUCEK, J., SUNDARESAN, J., AND ZHOU, Y. Rx: treating
bugs as allergies—a safe method to survive software failures. In Acm
sigops operating systems review (2005), vol. 39, ACM, pp. 235–248.
[54] THOMADAKIS, M. E. The Architecture of the Nehalem Processor
and Nehalem-EP SMP Platforms. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.455.4198&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
[55] VALASEK, C., AND MANDT, T. Windows 8 heap internals. Black Hat
2012.
[56] ZHONG, W. Dice: A Nondeterministic Memory Alignment Defense
Against Heap Taichi. PhD thesis, The Pennsylvania State University,
2011.
15
